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Coordination of Inter-Agency Action for
Nuclear Security in Uganda
Richard Sseggane
Atomic Energy Council Uganda

Abstract
Despite dynamic nuclear security threats to the Eastern and Central African regions, and decisions made
by the government of Uganda to embark on a nuclear power program, there have not been policies put in
place to encourage coordination and cooperation among the stakeholders in nuclear security activities.
Uganda needs to establish policies that streamline roles and mandates for nuclear security agencies,
including regulators, security and intelligence agencies, police, border control, transport control, customs
agencies, and others. The policies will allow stakeholder agencies to work together, as necessary, on
different nuclear security operations to strengthen the national nuclear security regime. This paper
considers findings from the review of the UK Nuclear Design Basis Approach, and a review of the current
situation at the state level in Uganda regarding the collaboration of stakeholders in nuclear security.

I.

Introduction: Nuclear Security in Uganda

Nuclear security is a relatively new concept in need of governance and regulatory systems in Uganda, as
well as many other African countries. Nuclear security is a resource-intensive undertaking and thus its
infrastructure and capabilities have not advanced in most developing countries: because these
governments have prioritized their available resources to address challenges seen as more life-threatening,
including poverty, hunger, health, energy, democracy, and social infrastructure development. With
growing nuclear technology applications and the increase in threats, Uganda must establish an effective
and efficient national nuclear security plan [1].
Nuclear facility threats have increased as a result of increased applications in nuclear and radiological
technology, making nuclear security a priority. There is widespread use of radioactive sources in
medicine, industry, mining, road construction, and other fields in Uganda. In 2015, the government
announced their intentions to embark on a nuclear power program. Their intention is problematic due to
the increased threats of nuclear terrorism from the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, who have previously
conducted severe terrorist attacks in Uganda. Al-Shabaab increases the nuclear security threat by taking
advantage of the porous borders around Uganda for smuggling nuclear or radioactive materials for sale or
blackmail.
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Roles and responsibilities are, by default, distributed among a number of stakeholders who are charged
with lead roles in different aspects of nuclear security within a state. In most cases, the major stakeholders
are government institutions that are established by national legal instruments. In many cases, the various
agencies coordinate and collaborate to assign responsibilities for advancement in nuclear security.
Collaborations between government agencies in Uganda are implemented through memoranda of
understanding between agencies in line with the legal instruments that establish specific agencies. There
is no established mechanism for coordination of joint operations, and this presents a challenge for nuclear
security.
Many different institutions work towards enhanced nuclear security—including regulation of nuclear and
radiological practices, border control, transport control, import and export control, and radioactive waste
management. Together, the institutions attempt to ensure nuclear security and safety, but they are
currently without an official, comprehensive, and collaborative program, which leads to gaps in
communication. Gaps can cause doubt and conflict among institutions and inhibits an efficient execution
of nuclear security work, hindering the effectiveness of the national nuclear security program at large.
A clear concept of collaborative communication, lobbying, sourcing, allocation, and management of
resources for nuclear security facilitates transparency and increases the effectiveness of nuclear security.
With all stakeholders having a round table where priorities, strategies, and decisions can be negotiated
and adopted, communication and consultation with external stakeholders and management in both bilateral and multi-lateral relationships will be more efficient.

A.

Collaboration among Nuclear Security Stakeholder
Agencies in Uganda

Uganda has protocols in place for the legal framework of nuclear security as it relates to the use of
nuclear material and radioactive sources. However, there are no protocols in place ensuring efficient and
effective coordination in the execution of inter-agency nuclear security activities. An absence of
permanent and inclusive institutional collaboration among key stakeholders for nuclear security policy
has led to identifiable gaps in inter-agency action.
The lack of a collaborative program hinders the optimization of the available resources, such as radiation
detection equipment and trained human resources. Agencies are only aware of what they themselves have
and are often unable to access assistance when needed, despite the fact that it may be available within the
country.

B.

Objective

The objective of this paper is to propose a plan for coordination and cooperation among major Ugandan
nuclear security stakeholder agencies in congruence with the nuclear security responsibilities and
operations. It identifies stakeholders’ nuclear security responsibilities and provides proposals for
establishing and maintaining an effective plan for inter-agency action.

II.

Why Inter-Agency Coordination?

A permanent framework for stakeholder inter-agency coordination and cooperation in nuclear security
would achieve the following goals:
a) Make the most efficient use of each organization’s resources in the context of existing mandates,
legal framework, and the objectives of the state’s nuclear security regime.
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b) Facilitate a common understanding of security situations, their consequences, and the way they
are expected to develop through an exchange of information (which may include monitoring and
technical data).
c) Foster a common and respectful approach to developing mandates for emergency-related
activities and procedures that would serve as communication to stakeholders, reports for the
government, and statements to the media and public.
d) Exchange information regarding an agency’s specific capabilities, actions planned, actions taken,
information received, and information released.
e) Promote efficient and coordinated provision of assistance to other parties in accordance with their
mandates, since several organizations may be approached with the same information or request.
f) Facilitate ad-hoc agreements on dividing work among national organizations, which may be
needed in emergency situations, nuclear security events, incidents, and other relevant situations,
as well as to solve any other practical problems.

III. Current Status: The Challenge
Due to the increase in radiological applications, the initiation of Uganda’s nuclear power program, and
the increase of nuclear security threats as discussed in section one, the following have been identified as
key issues affecting the coordination of inter-agency action for nuclear security in Uganda:
(1) The major stakeholder agencies and their roles in nuclear security have not clearly been identified
or utilized for the advancement of national nuclear security activities. The border and aviation
police departments are currently left out of the national nuclear security arrangements.
(2) The legal mandates of several stakeholder agencies do not clearly state roles, responsibilities, or
accountabilities for nuclear security. They also do not provide for methods enabling several
agencies to cooperate with each other.
(3) There are no state-level methods or programs that allow coordination and collaboration among
stakeholders that identify communication, commands, and reporting structures in nuclear security
initiatives.
With the lack of established nuclear security methods, the country faces inescapable realities related to its
nuclear security regime, and coordination of inter-agency action for nuclear security:
(1) Rising trends in the use of nuclear technologies in Uganda for health, agriculture, industry,
education, research, and power generation.
(2) Increased need for cooperation in nuclear security, with respect to the dynamic local and regional
nuclear security threat environment.
In light of these realities, inter-agency action for nuclear security should focus on eliminating duplicate
roles and optimizing resources for nuclear security. It should also identify key nuclear security
stakeholders. It should focus on eliminating gaps and overlaps in the nuclear security regime through
streamlining accountabilities for various aspects of nuclear security in the country.
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IV. Reviewing the UK Nuclear Design Basis Threat
Approach
This section presents the findings from a study of the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) national system for
prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism and protection of nuclear material, radioactive sources, associated
equipment, and facilities in the civil nuclear industry. This information was obtained from publicly
accessible documents and other open and unclassified sources of information, mainly the internet.1
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS)
have commended the UK for having implemented a solid, efficient, and effective nuclear security regime
as regards both physical protection of materials and facilities, and preparedness for detection and response
to nuclear security events [2].

A.

The UK Design Basis Threat

In the United Kingdom the Design Basis Threat (DBT) document is referred to as the Nuclear Industries
Malicious Capabilities (Planning) Assumptions (NIMCA) and its preparation is coordinated via the Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), which is the UK centre for all source analysis and assessment of
international terrorism. JTAC sets threat levels and issues analytical reporting to government departments
and agencies [3].
NIMCA is prepared for systematic national threat assessments that take into account the inventory of civil
nuclear material, radioactive sources, and associated equipment and facilities. The country acquires input
from all relevant security and intelligence organizations and agencies, both at home and abroad, including
those from other states. JTAC performs the coordinating role for the preparation of NIMCA.
The UK’s DBT is a dynamic document that has a formal annual review process. JTAC examines all
current intelligence relating to the UK’s nuclear industry and can demand a review and update as needed
per new threat information provided by JTAC. Conclusions are used to establish the type of threat the
civil nuclear industry should protect against as stipulated in the nuclear security regulatory requirements,
the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations of 2003 (NISR 2003). The Conclusions are recorded in a
document which was issued by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), known as the ‘NIMCA’, (UK’s
DBT). This provides the basis for the design, implementation, and management of security measures and
systems undertaken by regulated civil nuclear industries in the United Kingdom.
NIMCA sets the “threat” bar for physical protection systems and the provision of security resources by
the operators which are expected to be sufficient enough to sustain an effective and proportionate security
posture on a daily basis. It also allows for a re-posturing of security activity if a national change in threat
demands it [3, 4].
(Figure 1) illustrates the UK’s approach to DBTs, and how its outcomes are conceptually put to use by the
UK’s nuclear industry. It includes three sections: Section 1 involves national agencies that conduct an
overall national threat assessment and, from it, extract conclusions for the NIMCA; Section 2 involves
two independent state agencies that are charged with overseeing the implementation of protective
measures to counter the NIMCA; and Section 3 involves the nuclear industry or the licensed nuclear
operators who have the responsibility to put in place industry-level protection measures against the
NIMCA threats.

1

No interviews were conducted and no single individual from either within or outside the United Kingdom was
consulted or interviewed in the preparation of this work for purposes of studying the UK nuclear security system.
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Figure 1: UK Nuclear DBT Approach at a glance. Image Source:
http://spaces.icgpartners.com/index2.asp?NGuid=EB4EC67E60964507A925F56CE316334E

V.

Way Forward: Proposals

A nuclear security–focused research case study for coordination of inter-agency action for Uganda was
compared to a good practice model used in the United Kingdom. This section describes the need for
effective collaboration and the need to further generate recommendations towards improving
coordination. This paper makes a number of general and specific stakeholder recommendations, based on
which a model for coordination and cooperation of nuclear security in Uganda can be developed.

A.

General Recommendations

Below are suggestions for coordination of inter-agency action for strengthening Uganda’s nuclear security
regime.
1) The border police and aviation police departments are currently left out of the arrangements for
inter-agency nuclear security operations. These departments must be brought on board to close
the gaps in combatting illicit trafficking of radioactive sources and nuclear material. This will
strengthen the nuclear security detection methods in airports and border entry points, thus
minimizing the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials across Uganda’s
borders [5].
2) National-level policies should be developed for coordination among the stakeholder agencies that
specify the means and mechanisms for how several agencies will cooperate in executing their
mandates related to nuclear security [6].
3) Under the auspices of the nuclear and radiological regulatory body, inter-agency nuclear security
working groups should be established and required to participate in regular meetings. There
should be formally appointed representatives from the relevant stakeholder agencies, as per its
periodic work plan, to prepare the DBT, to organize nuclear security measures for major public
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events, to monitor shipments of nuclear or radioactive materials, and to perform any other tasks
as assigned by the national nuclear security committee.
4) With the introduction of the nuclear power program, a special unit of the police should be
established, trained, and equipped with the skills and abilities to protect nuclear installations,
defend/respond to attacks to them, and pursue and recover lost nuclear or radioactive materials.
This measure has been effective in the United Kingdom and is implemented through the Civil
Nuclear Constabulary [7].
5) The national security and intelligence agencies should intensify their efforts in assessing nuclear
threat information and putting measures and expertise in place to manage threats to the nuclear
industry [8]. As the potential targets for theft and sabotage of nuclear and radioactive materials
and facilities increase, so should the national intelligence service to effectively counter it.
6) The National Security Organizations Act of 1987 should be reviewed to establish the duties of the
National Security Council secretariat, adding roles for receiving, reviewing, and disseminating
the nuclear threat information to the head of the national nuclear and radiological regulatory body
for preparation, review, and update of the DBT [9, 10].
7) There should be open communication among agencies before and during nuclear security
operations. A clear chain of command and distribution of key responsibilities should be assigned,
especially during joint operations and incidents, as well as a designated top office from which
incident or operations management instructions are taken [11].
8) Communication officers for media and the public should be established for nuclear security
events to inform the public about the inter-agency action for nuclear security in the country [12].
9) Defined procedures on how to activate interagency in a joint operation or in response to an
incident is essential; they should be clear about to whom, when, and how the incident or operation
is declared complete and closed. It should further be specified how recovered/seized nuclear or
radioactive material should be stored and managed [8].

B.

Stakeholder-Specific Recommendations

This section provides recommendations for roles and activities specific to each individual stakeholder
agency to effectively coordinate inter-agency action for nuclear security. The recommendations have been
tabulated with an additional recommendation about whether a particular stakeholder should be part of the
National Nuclear Security Committee (NNSC), based on the agency’s mandate and sensitivity of
information accessible to this committee.
Table 1: Recommended stakeholder roles for coordinated interagency action for nuclear security in Uganda

#

Stakeholder agency

Roles and responsibilities

NNSC
Membership

1

Nuclear &
Radiological
Regulatory body

•

Yes

•

Issuing regulations and guidance for all nuclear
and radiological activities in the country and
monitoring and verifying adherence to them.
Inspecting and enforcing the nuclear security
regulations and monitoring potential threats to
facilities in collaboration with other stakeholders
[13].

Regulator sets
requirements and
verifies physical
protection in
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•

•
•

•
•

•

•

2

National Police

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

3

National Security
•
Council (Secretariat)

Implementing international commitments related
to nuclear security and disseminating scientific,
technical, and regulatory information to
stakeholders.
Maintaining communication among and
coordinating with other nuclear security agencies
in and outside the country.
Obtaining nuclear threat information from the
National Security Council secretariat and
coordinating the preparation of the national
nuclear Design Basis Threat [5].
Establishing physical protection and security
requirements for facilities based on the adopted
DBT statement [14].
Coordinating and organizing administrative and
capacity- building inter-agency activities,
including training of personnel and working
group meetings.
Providing nuclear and radiological expert
assistance and guidance to other stakeholders in
the prevention of, detection of, and response to
incidents [10].
Organizing training and capacity development
for other stakeholders.

facilities in view
of the DBT.

Enforcing nuclear security laws, regulatory
requirements, and other related laws within the
state.
Participating in nuclear threat assessment and
preparation of the national nuclear Design Basis
Threat [5].
Collecting and sharing additional intelligence
information with intelligence and other security
agencies on the nuclear threats.
Acting as guards for some sites and acting as first
responders to incidents and nuclear security
events in and outside nuclear facilities.
Providing security support and backup as off-site
responders to nuclear and radiological facilities.
Participating in nuclear security measures for
major public events in collaboration with other
stakeholder agencies [10].
Responding to incidents and nuclear security
events, arresting culprits, managing crime scenes,
collecting evidence, performing forensic
analyses, and prosecuting offenders.

Yes

Receiving the state’s security intelligence
information from the internal and external
security organizations and processing it to define

No

Also provides
radiological
expert assistance
and advice during
nuclear security
events.

Police responds
to nuclear
security events
and requires
quick contact and
understanding of
the coordination
system to
perform well and
support other
agencies.
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•

4

Security Intelligence
Service [15]

•

•
•

5

Customs and Border
Control Agency

•

•
•

•

6

Licensed Operators

•

•

•
•
•

the threats to the country’s nuclear and
radiological facilities and activities.
Disseminating the nuclear threat information to
the head of the national nuclear and radiological
regulatory authority at periodic, prescribed
times—and as need arises when the threat
changes.

It is not involved
in actual
operations but
high level
national strategic
aspects.

Gathering and submitting intelligence on threats
to the nuclear security and any related aspects of
the National Security Council and relevant
security agencies.
Participating in threat assessment and
development of the nuclear DBT.
May work hand-in-hand with other security
agencies in analyzing criminal and military
strategic intelligence relating to nuclear security.

Yes

Verifying compliance with legal and regulatory
requirements for transport, import, export, and
trans-shipments of nuclear material and
radioactive sources.
Detection and initial response to illicit trafficking
of nuclear material and radioactive sources at
borders, ports, and airports [16].
Notifying and communicating with fellow
nuclear security competent authorities upon
detection of trafficked nuclear and radioactive
material.
Maintaining and exchanging information with the
regulator on import/export and trans-shipments
of nuclear material and radioactive sources [8].

Yes

Implementing the best physical protection
systems for the nuclear material and radioactive
sources and associated equipment within their
facilities against a Design Basis Threat [14].
Designing, implementing, and maintaining
technical solutions that satisfy regulatory
requirements related to physical protection and
security of nuclear material or radioactive
sources in their facilities.
Ensure first-level control of radioactive sources
and nuclear material in their facilities and
practices.
Verify the skills and appropriate training of
personnel employed in facilities.
Inform the regulatory body of any event affecting
or likely to affect the security of the nuclear

No

They are crucial
in DBT
development

They are crucial
in implementing
the nuclear
security detection
architecture at
borders.

They may not be
cleared to access
intelligence
information
beyond their
facility specific
DBT.
They receive
relevant
information
through the
regulatory body.
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•
•

7

Local/Municipal
Authorities

•
•

8

The Military

•
•
•

9

Emergency Medical
Service

•

•

10

Foreign Affairs
Ministry

•
•
•

11

Justice Ministry

•

material or radioactive sources and the facility at
large, and as appropriate, request support.
Maintain coordination with relevant state and
local organizations that are involved in the
nuclear security efforts.
Implement a quality assurance system for the
physical protection and security of sources and/or
nuclear material.
Assisting in the dissemination of information,
evacuation of residents, and general management
of the crisis in case of a nuclear security event.
Mobilizing the population near nuclear and
radiological facilities to adhere to security
guidance and sharing of information on possible
threats.

No

Detecting and neutralizing of cross-border
nuclear threats, advising fellow competent
authorities on security of information [8].
Stepping in when nuclear security events escalate
out of hand for the police and for incidents and
attacks that are beyond the defined DBT.
Providing support to on-site security at nuclear
power plants and similar facilities in case of
high-level events when contacted [14].

Yes

Developing national capacity for handling and
treatment of cases of high exposure and
contamination, including mechanisms for seeking
external assistance in escalated cases.
Providing the treatment of individuals affected by
contamination or exposure resulting from a
nuclear security event or incident including
exposed or contaminated members of the
response team.

No

Continuously scrutinizing and being party to
relevant international legal instruments for
nuclear security.
Keeping the country engaged in bilateral and
multilateral international nuclear security
arrangements and programs.
Requesting for external assistance in cases of
escalated nuclear security events [8].

Yes

Drafting or preparing and adopting state-level
nuclear security legislation, including laws,
regulations, and inter-agency coordination

No

Information
security
considerations

They need to
keep updated on
the DBT to
streamline terms
and situations for
their intervention
in civil nuclear
security.

They respond
only on call and
may not cleared
to access
intelligence
information

They need to
ready measures
for obtaining
international
assistance.
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procedures. Also ensuring presence of provisions
for prosecution and penalties for offenders.
12

National Nuclear
Security Committee

•
•
•
•

C.

No roles outside
legal actions.

Overseeing the coordination of inter-agency agency action and
developing general policies and strategies for the state’s nuclear
security regime.
Reviewing the national nuclear DBT and making policy decisions for
implementation of suitable nuclear security measures.
Developing and reviewing concepts of operation for inter-agency
action in nuclear security in the state and appraising nuclear security
performance.
Approving and adopting strategies and measures for inter-agency
action in nuclear security.

The Inter-Agency Coordination Model

The recommendations above would result in the most practical model for coordinating inter-agency
action for nuclear security in Uganda, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Coordination model for inter-agency nuclear security action in Uganda.
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VI. Conclusion
In view of Uganda’s nuclear security situation, with lessons from the UK’s approach to collaboration of
nuclear stakeholders, and also in consideration of international recommendations from the IAEA, a
number of general and specific recommendations were generated and a coordination model for interagency action for nuclear security was suggested.
Stakeholders’ coordination on both global and state levels is critical to achieving the intended outcomes
of the nuclear security efforts and enables effective use of taxpayer resources. Without coordination on all
levels, communication is poor, money is wasted, equipment goes unused, gaps are unnoticed,
opportunities are missed, and good will is squandered. No one wins awards or makes headlines with this
thankless task of effective inter-agency coordination; however, without it there is a greater security risk,
and aspiring nuclear terrorists are more likely to acquire the materials, skills, and opportunities to kill
millions and inflict economic and political havoc.
This paper discussed the state of nuclear security in Uganda with a major focus on collaboration among
the different nuclear security stakeholder agencies. These observations were made in response to the
growing nuclear and radiological application prospects with respect to the prevailing nuclear security
threats. It discussed the need for effective coordination of inter-agency action in nuclear security,
outlining a number of collaboration opportunities; it also looked at possible risks arising from
uncoordinated approaches of stakeholder agencies in the country. The approach adopted in the UK in the
development and use of their DBT, NIMCA, was reviewed and noted as a commendable practice case.
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